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Regarding the second, surely we regard people who have severe memory 
loss as identical to their previous selves, so why not regard reincarnation 
as analogous to severe memory loss? Alternatively, one could say that 
what happens in reincarnation is just like what happens in Reid’s example 
of the old general, except the whole process happens much quicker, so 
there is memory continuity even though the newly reincarnated person 
does not remember anything about his earlier self (just as the old general 
does not remember anything about what his boyhood self did).
Overall, Christian Philosophical Theology is a solid work. Researchers in 
the fi eld will certainly want to be familiar with its arguments, especially 
those in chapters 13 and 15.
Crucible of Reason: Intentional Action, Practical Rationality, and Weakness of 
Will, by Keith D. Wyma. Rowman & Litt lefi eld, 2004. 307 pp. $85 (cloth), 
$29.95 (paper).
NOEL HENDRICKSON, James Madison University
One of the most puzzling aspects of human agency is how we are capable 
of performing actions that are both intentional and against deeply-held 
judgments about what should be done (i.e., “akratic” or “weak-willed” 
actions). This is particularly diﬃ  cult to understand in light of a central 
feature of some theories of intentional action, which holds that an action 
qualifi es as intentional only if it is done because of, and according to, a 
judgment that the action should be done (i.e., “rational-action” theories). 
While such theories are widely held, they have a notoriously diﬃ  cult time 
accounting for weak-willed actions. For, they require of intentional ac-
tion the very thing that is absent in cases of weakness of the will (namely, 
conforming to the agent’s judgments about what should be done). In the 
Crucible of Reason, Keith D. Wyma thoughtfully tackles this diﬃ  cult chal-
lenge with an extremely intricate examination of att empts by rational-ac-
tion theorists to account for weak-willed actions. He provides a detailed 
discussion of the work of R. M. Hare, Donald Davidson, and (especially) 
Thomas Aquinas. Ultimately, he contends that each theorist is unable to 
account for the phenomenon of weak-willed actions, especially in its more 
robust varieties. In response, he develops a new (modifi ed) Thomistic ap-
proach to accommodate more fully the real-life experience of weakness 
of the will. In addition, because this new approach works best in a full-
fl edged Thomistic and Christian framework, he provocatively suggests 
that the ability to account for weak-willed actions may serve as a part of 
the overall inductive case for Christian theism.
Wyma provides a careful, thorough, and charitable examination of 
each of the three thinkers. Among a variety of criticisms, he insightfully 
argues that each of them ultimately has to deny the reality of weakness of 
the will (at least in its most robust forms). Wyma contends that our real-
life experience of weak-willed actions includes extremely robust instances 
such as acting against fully rational judgments, against knowledge that 
what we are doing is wrong, and even against fully-formed intentions 
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to do otherwise. It is impossible to capture the subtlety and detail of his 
discussion of these three thinkers here. But, roughly, Wyma argues that 
Hare must deny the reality of weak-willed actions against fully rational 
moral judgments, Davidson must deny the reality of weak-willed actions 
against intentions to do something else, and Aquinas (unmodifi ed) must 
deny the reality of weak-willed actions done against actively considered 
knowledge of their wrongness. Wyma argues that Hare’s account of fully 
rational judgments as fully-informed and providing an overriding ra-
tional preference makes them either unatt ainable for human beings or 
impossible to act against. Hence, Hare is forced to explain away our ex-
perience of acting against our fully rational judgments. Wyma further 
demonstrates that Davidson’s account of intentions as involving “uncon-
ditional judgments” that lead to actions makes them either part of a par-
titioned mind or impossible to act against. Thus, Davidson has to explain 
away the phenomenon of acting against fully-formed intentions (or rely 
upon a problematic model of mental partitioning). Wyma also proposes 
that Aquinas’s model of weak-willed actions, which holds that passion 
can distract an agent so that he does not actively consider his knowledge 
that acting on that passion is wrong, makes it impossible for an agent to 
act against such knowledge. Therefore, Aquinas (unmodifi ed) also has to 
deny an aspect of our real-life akratic experience, namely, actions done 
despite active awareness that the action ought not to be done.
Wyma’s discussion of his new, modifi ed Thomistic account is also too 
rich and extensive to summarize adequately here. Among other things, it 
involves adopting a diﬀ erent interpretation than Aquinas has of Aristotle’s 
distinction between having and att ending to knowledge, a more thoroughly 
Augustinian account of habits, and an account of intentionality in action as 
a matt er of degrees. For the purposes of space, I focus on the third of these, 
which strikes me as the aspect of the proposal that is of the most general 
interest. Building on Aquinas, Wyma proposes that an action is rational and 
intentional as a matt er of degrees: the extent to which it conforms to ide-
ally rational standards (which are ultimately defi ned in terms of an ideal 
exemplar: God). That preserves the rational-action theories, since inten-
tionality in action essentially involves rationality. However, it also makes 
weak-willed actions possible: One could violate a fully rational (contra 
Hare), intended (contra Davidson), and actively known (contra unmodi-
fi ed Aquinas) judgment but still act rationally. Rationality, then, is a matt er 
of degrees, and on his account, intentionality in action is as well. The seem-
ing problem for rational-action accounts in accommodating weak-willed 
actions comes from taking intentionality, or perhaps rationality, in action as 
an “all or nothing” matt er. Clearly, weak-willed actions are not themselves 
fully rational. But, if intentionality implies rationality, and neither admit of 
degrees, then no weak-willed action can be intentional either. On the other 
hand, if there are degrees of both rationality and intentionality in action, 
then the weak-willed actions can be intentional (at least to some extent). 
Thus, Wyma’s account would constitute a substantial improvement over 
the theories of Hare, Davidson, and Aquinas.
The overall philosophical argumentation presented in Crucible of Rea-
son is most powerful as a critique of the three theories. And, much of that 
eﬀ ectiveness derives from a strong and consistent insistence that any sat-
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isfying account must capture the full-range of the real-life experience of 
weakness of will (especially its most robust forms). The case for the al-
ternative perspective is somewhat less compelling because it is open to 
the charge that it also fails to adequately account for the stronger variet-
ies of our akratic experience. For, on Wyma’s alternate proposal, while 
weak-willed actions do always qualify as intentional, they do not ever 
qualify as fully intentional. But, just as the real phenomenon of weakness 
of will involves acting against fully rational judgments, intentions to do 
the contrary, and actively considered knowledge, does it not also seem to 
involve acting in a fully intentional manner? Do we not seem to be acting 
as intentionally as we ever do when we act against our bett er judgment? 
Phenomenologically, it would seem that we do. Perhaps one may worry 
about relying so heavily upon our experiences, or our intuitive analyses 
of them, but it is that sort of reliance that makes Wyma’s criticisms of 
Hare, Davidson, and Aquinas so compelling. And, it would seem that it 
also makes his positive proposal not entirely satisfying either. Something 
about the phenomena of weak-willed action still seems compromised if 
we admit that such actions are not entirely intentional. Nonetheless, it 
does seem that Wyma’s position is an improvement over Hare, Davidson, 
and Aquinas, but it does not yet seem to be completely satisfying. It may 
be, however, that any rational-action theory will be forced to admit that 
weak-willed actions are not entirely intentional since such accounts take 
rationality to be essential to intentionality. In that case, perhaps this is the 
best such theories can do.
Wyma also makes some very intriguing suggestions about how account-
ing for weakness of the will could play a role in an overall inductive case for 
Christian theism. His positive proposal works best in a general Thomistic 
framework with references to (among other things): (1) an account of origi-
nal sin, (2) a theory of the habit-forming consequences of sinful behavior, 
and (3) the notion of God as the defi ning exemplar of perfect rationality 
(and intentionality) in action. As such, if his proposed account of weakness 
of the will were the most adequate, it could (potentially) lend some sup-
port to 1–3 and the further suppositions that they involve. Now, relying on 
God as the defi ning exemplar of rationality is likely to raise all the suspi-
cions (and usual arguments) that att end to parallel theories about relying 
on Him as the defi ning exemplar of moral goodness. We would have a kind 
of divine command theory of rationality and intentionality. As such, it is 
not entirely clear that such ideas are likely to aid progress in debates over 
the plausibility of Christian theism. For, it is unlikely that divine command 
theories of rationality and intentionality would fare any bett er (or be less 
controversial) than such theories of moral goodness. The idea of employing 
a Thomistic/Christian psychology in order to explain weakness of the will 
is more promising. Aft er all, there has been relatively litt le discussion of the 
question as to why we as human beings seem so susceptible to weakness 
of will despite our very powerful rational faculties. The notion of human 
beings as “fallen” and in need of some sort of redemption might turn out to 
have some explanatory force in this context. Here, Wyma has made some 
possibly groundbreaking suggestions as to how we might explore that pos-
sibility. Obviously, what he explores in this work remains fairly speculative, 
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but it should provide some inspiration to others for new areas to explore in 
Christian philosophy.
Overall, Wyma addresses a serious challenge in action theory, and 
brings together an unusually diverse range of thinkers. His work will be 
useful for those interested in contemporary action theory or philosophi-
cal psychology, as well as inspiring for those who wish to explore new 
avenues in developing the overall case for Christian theism. In addition, 
the extensive and illuminating discussion of Aquinas’s work makes it an 
absolute “must read” for anyone working on Thomistic or Medieval action 
theory/philosophical psychology.
